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Those who speak the same language are joined together by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human art begins ... they belong together and are by nature one and inseparable whole.

—Fichte

“GENEVA 1977: A REPORT ON THE Hemispheric Movement of Indigenous Peoples” includes the record of the experience of twenty-two delegates of the Hau de no sau nee, or the people of the Iroquois Confederacy, when they attempted to enter Switzerland with passports issued by the Confederacy to attend a U.N. conference on indigenous peoples. Swiss customs officials were perplexed by the unfamiliar passports, but, seemingly inclined to be generous with the delegates, offered a “special entry permit.” The delegates discussed the offer: “It seems to me,” one of the Hau de no sau nee delegates said, “that this permit, by virtue of being a special permit, tends to negate the validity of our passports.”(FN1) The Hau de no sau nee refused the special permit. As the Swiss officials conferred the delegates joked about contacting the “Iroquois consulate.” At last an acceptable offer was made: an entry permit was issued that was used for passports from nations that had no formal relations with Switzerland. A recognition of the Hau de no sau nee national identity had been made; the delegates legally entered Geneva to attend the conference where they submitted a paper titled “The Obvious Fact of Our Existence” that began with the following:

Since the beginning of human time, the Hau de no sau nee have occupied the distinct territories that we call our homelands. That occupation has been both organized and continuous. We have long defined the borders of our country, have long maintained the exclusive use-right of the areas within those borders, and have used those territories as the economic and cultural definitions of our nation. The Hau de no sau nee are a distinct people, with our own laws and customs, territories, political organization and economy. In short, the Hau de no sau nee, or Six Nations, fits in every way every definition of nationhood.(FN2)

As in the above, the Hau de no sau nee repeatedly emphasized that their persistent occupation of a particular territory was inseparable from their identity as a people and that it, in turn, formed the basis of their national status. The delegates explained to the international audience of diplomats, activists, lawyers, and reporters that they observed no distinction between the external, physical borders of the territory they occupied and their idea of personal and group identity, what I term here, following Fichte’s use outlined below, their “internal” borders. The strategy of the delegates was to make explicit their entitlement to the legal privileges of nationhood by emphasizing the unity of the territorial and the psychological—the internal and external borders—standards that Western nations had long used to define and defend their own national privileges.

Of course, most generally, identity can be defined according to a wide range of factors, including territory, gender, race, ethnicity, age, or any of an infinite number of consumer and/or lifestyle choices. Identity, according to critical consensus, is complex, multivalent, unstable. This essay attempts to bridge the philosophical and the material to facilitate a comprehension of both the disruption and deployment of particular (and particularistic) identities. I focus here on the historical ambivalence of “native” American identity; that is, I consider the filiation of exclusionary United States nativism and the

combined idealization and appropriation of the “identity” of indigenous American peoples. My examination revolves around and through the contours of national contestations. The appropriation or even “invention” of native American identity by figures and within discourses concerned with U.S. nation building is utterly inseparable from the violent appropriation of territory held by native peoples. The consequent deployment of the idea of “nation” among indigenous peoples in the United States is likewise inseparable from ongoing struggles to regain illegally expropriated land.

A strand of philosophical inquiry regarding identity and nationalism which explicitly considers the multivalence of borders has been largely ignored by critics concerned with such questions. I have in mind here Fichte, whose despotic rationalism and association with the rise and the philosophical justifications of German nationalism are largely responsible for the paucity of attention he has received.(FN3) Regarding Fichte as a principal philosopher of national socialism is, however, itself a species of concession to Nazi historiography. The Nazi historical propaganda machine seized upon and elaborated a particular version of Fichte, as it did of Nietzsche, to service the promotion and justification of fascism. Fichte’s was, in fact, chiefly a cosmopolitan philosophy until historical circumstances led him to reconsider his support of the French Revolution. As one historian has noted, “the Prussian and Nazi claims to Fichte are not at all as solid and comprehensive as they would wish them to be.... [In fact] it would be possible to argue that many of his ideas were the very opposite of Prussianism and Hitlerism.”(FN4)

Fichte, particularly in his *Addresses to the German Nation*, is especially useful to understanding the deployment, invention, and justifications of nationalism, expressly because of the ironic historical context of his philosophical and political activity. Though Fichte’s name has become, at a problematic level, indissociable from fascist nationalisms, it is good to remember that his theses regarding language and national identity were most fully elaborated after the defeat and occupation of Prussia by Napoleon. In this context his ideas can be read as primarily defensive, which the development of his notions of “internal” and “external” borders suggests. For Fichte, national identity becomes of paramount importance when the territory of the nation has been compromised. External borders are associated with land and the actual geography of the nation; when these borders are violently overwhelmed what remains are internal borders. In the condition of defeat the nation can be located only “internally,” that is, in common traits of individuals, or, for Fichte, language. Frantz Fanon, whose name is synonymous with the struggles of colonized subjects and nations, implies a similar conception of internal and external borders when he writes that the quarter the colonized subject occupies “is a world without spaciousness.”(FN5) Thus, “for a colonized people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land.”(FN6)

I am suggesting that Fichte’s model has a great deal of use in helping us to understand the complex terms of imperialistic and resistant nationalist deployments. We might consider the potential political ambivalence of the following articulation by the Native American activist/scholar Vine Deloria:

No movement can sustain itself, no people can continue, no government can function, and no religion can become a reality except it be bound to a land area of its own.... So-called power movements [e.g. Red power] are primarily the urge of peoples to find their home and to channel their psychic energies through their land into social and economic reality. Without a land and a homeland no movement can survive.(FN7)

A “people” requires external borders capable of economically sustaining a political form, that is, a state.(FN8) Yet, a condition of such a requirement is the presence of

a people in the first place. I emphasize the latter both to stress the spatial origins and, indeed, ambitions of nationalist movements and to suggest the potent inflection of nationalist urges for America's "first peoples." If nationalism is a struggle for place based on identity ("real" or "invented"), if it can be seen as establishing an external geographic correlate for internal borders established, presumably, through the sharing of some place "in the past," then the precise political motivations for the appropriation of native identity by emphatically non-native Americans is revealed.

According to Fichte in the epigraph above, language is a natural fact, an organic binding agent among people that secures their unified, and finally national, identity. Fichte writes in the "Thirteenth Address," that "we give the name of people to men whose organs of speech are influenced by the same external conditions, who live together, and who develop their language in continuous communication with each other."(FN9) In the "Fourth Address" he first specifies the privileging of place and language in terms of the German exceptionalism that made him so attractive to Nazi historians:

The first and immediately obvious difference between the fortunes of the Germans and the other branches which grew from the same root is this: the former remained in the original dwelling-places of the ancestral stock, whereas the latter emigrated to other places; the former retained and developed the original language of the ancestral stock, whereas the latter adopted a foreign language and gradually reshaped it in a way of their own.(FN10)

The political philosopher Elie Kedourie has provided the most extensive consideration of Fichte's linguistic nationalism and its relation to fascism. Kedourie's most valuable observations surround his description of the close connection between language and violence:

[I]f states must be formed of linguistically homogenous nations, then in areas of mixed speech, the unity of the national state is sorely disturbed; for, as Fichte points out, "such a whole (as a nation), if it wishes to absorb and mingle with itself any other people of different descent and language, cannot do so without itself becoming confused ... and violently disturbing the even process of its culture." This emphasis transformed [the nation] into what it had seldom been before, into a political issue for which men are ready to kill and exterminate each other.(FN11)

Violence arises where the "nation" is threatened by a difference expressed internally. It is true—obviously so—that violence defines contestations over external borders, where aggressors are clearly marked by the external appurtenance of swords and guns. But Kedouri employs Fichte to explain violence between "peoples" who cannot be clearly distinguished from each other and who reside in an equivocal national geography. Napoleon's occupation of Prussia rendered the external German nation—that is, the geographic borders that defined German-speaking principalities—compromised and ambiguous. Thus the internal border increasingly came to define the nation; it was worth fighting for as tenaciously as any external border. Language, for Fichte, clarifies the internal borders and supports the possibility, and the hope, for a resuscitation of the geographically uncompromised nation.

Largely because such linguistic criteria were absent, Kedouri asserted that nationalism did not exist in America. Certainly patriotism and xenophobia could be found, but in keeping with Fichte's account, Kedourie maintains the example of Germany as paradigmatic and therefore overdetermines the linguistic criteria, paradoxically honoring while critiquing the very constructions of nationalist philology. In the following I contend that in the United States a doubly nativist natural history operated as a substitute for romantic philology, effectively constituting a national and

nationalist identity that functioned to promote and justify imperialist violence. Early natural scientists occupied by the study of American “pre”-history appropriated an idealized, or even fantasized, Native American identity to elaborate a national culture and a universal while exclusive identity that served to justify the territorial appropriations of continental expansion.

According to nationalist principles defined and elaborated by Fichte and Kedouri, language is understood as a sign of “racial” differentiation. As Kedouri explains,

Originally, the [linguistic] doctrine emphasized language as the test of nationality, because language was the outward sign of a group’s peculiar identity and a significant means of ensuring its continuity. But a nation’s language was peculiar to that nation only because such a nation constituted a racial stock distinct from other nations.... It was then no accident that racial classifications were, at the same time, linguistic ones, and that [for instance], the Nazis distinguished the members of the German Aryan race scattered in Central and Eastern Europe by a linguistic criterion.(FN12)

If, as Kedouri asserts, language signified a privileged biology, or race—in a tautological, although unacknowledged, fashion—because of its identifiable nature, then the tenuousness of such identifications is likewise immediately disclosed. After all, contrary to Kedouri, language is anything but an “outward sign”; certainly it is impossible to locate in a photograph. In fact, we should probably regard the Nazi hostility to the deaf and mute less as a parcel of an active genetic cleansing than part of a linguistic cleansing: the elimination of Germans who could articulate no “sign” of being Germans. Those who could not speak their German essence were potentially not German at all. The principle of linguistic criteria for nationalist identity, where nation and race are utterly inseparable, reveals the absence of all other “outward” criteria and the thin, even fictional, nature of “racial” criteria in general.

Of course the utility of national identity, which provides the basis for epistemologies of human organization and territorial security, is too great for the concept to be readily disposed of, which is precisely why the notion of linguistics was exploited in the first place. This understanding is at the center of Kedouri’s analysis. What it suggests is that, finally, linguistics is not a necessary or even essential aspect of national definition, but a historically contingent one. Further, Fichte’s use of linguistic criteria, because it so obviously discloses the repression of empirical absence, or lack of “outward sign,” as the enabling move of nationalist identity formulation, suggests the force and character of, if you will, the nationalist identity “drive” (to use a potent psychological term). Kedouri makes clear that “science,” in his case, philology, is crucially implicated in repression, fabrication, and nationalism, and it is these abstract processes, rather than the more or less materially “evident” one of language, that are the essential aspects of the invention of nationalist identity.

In the eighteenth century, expressing a familiar anxiety about the prospects for the maintenance of order in the young republic, Noah Webster pursued, albeit *avant le lettre*, what appear to be Fichtean notions of linguistic unity for the United States: “A national language is a bond of national union. ... [It should] be employed to render the people of this country national.”(FN13) But, as Richard M. Rollins has explained, Webster’s devotion to nationalism had dissipated by the time he composed his dictionary in the early nineteenth century.(FN14) Webster “perceived himself to be writing merely an ‘American’ dictionary of the English language.... [Webster noted] that the body of the language was basically the same as that of England. He added a revealing statement: ‘It is desirable to perpetuate that sameness.’”(FN15) Webster’s dictionary became, in fact, the standard in England.(FN16) Webster’s principal concern was political; he sought means to control the “unruly” people of the fledgling

democracy. He intended his dictionary to act as an authority capable of affecting the behavior of people Webster did not trust. If nationalism is primarily about “a people” and the space, or “homeland” of their longed-for sovereignty, then Webster, in the end, fails to qualify as a nationalist.(FN17)

There were also various cultural and/or literary attempts to attach particular language forms to those imagined as “incorporated” (or not) into the American body politic. The use of slang and dialect, particularly by white writers and even more particularly by literary naturalists such as Stephen Crane and Frank Norris, certainly represents an attempt to have language reveal class, racial, and finally national status or category. But, while naturalism may have held scientific pretensions, it did not seriously compete with “science” in terms of broad national influence. As naturalism’s anxiety about the status of its observations as science immediately reveals, in the later nineteenth century the “natural” scientist was America’s figure of discursive authority. It was, in large part, in the manifold arenas of natural science that national identity was to be formulated and fabricated. But, this is not at all to say that the cultural factor that language decisively denotes was replaced by natural science. On the contrary, natural science worked precisely to disclose the American cultural “myth of origins and national continuity,” to use Etienne Balibar’s formulation.(FN18)

Balibar also writes that the “history of nations . . . is always already presented to us in the form of a narrative which attributes to these entities the continuity of a subject.”(FN19) Nations require narratives of historical depth and transcendent futures enacted by some “people.” The narrativizing of nationhood is greatly facilitated, as the German case suggests, by identifiable “generations which succeed one another over centuries on a reasonably stable territory.”(FN20) No such spatial and generational continuity existed for the immigrant European Americans. Even those who could trace themselves to the earliest colonists could still only lay claim to a rather brief tenure. But of course such a generational continuity did exist in America; it was held by Native Americans. In brief, my argument asserts this: the American nationalist narrative, with natural scientists operating as principal agents, would mine the Native for history and for the constitution of a “people.” But, most crucially, such a cultural mining and appropriation was a spatial operation, destroying and delimiting both external and internal borders in an ambivalent and complex fashion.

1.

The drawing below—which has not been reprinted since its original publication in 1910—was sketched by the famous British evolutionary scientist Thomas Huxley when he visited the United States to examine equine specimens gathered by America’s first professional paleontologist, Otheniel Marsh. Huxley intended the drawing as a “joke.”

Huxley was visiting Marsh and his specimens at Yale’s Peabody Museum. He wrote of the fossils’ crucial scientific importance, that they “demonstrated the evolution of the horse beyond question, and for the first time indicated the direct line of descent of an existing animal” (my emphasis).(FN21) Marsh had also collected fossils of “toothed birds” on his expeditions. These fossils were even more crucial to the proof of evolution. None less than Charles Darwin wrote to Marsh: “Your work on these old birds, and on the many fossil animals of North America, has afforded the best support to the theory of Evolution, which has appeared within the last twenty years.”(FN22) Huxley commented more decisively on the birds’ importance: “The discovery of the toothed birds of the cretaceous formation of N. America, by Prof. Marsh, completed the series of transitional forms between birds and reptiles, and removed Mr. Darwin’s propositions concerning evolution from the region of hypothesis to that of demonstrable fact.”(FN23) Marsh, in short, was considered instrumental in providing evidence for the

origins, linearity, and organic unity of life. According to his biographer and student, George Bird Grinnell, "A firm believer in the theory of evolution, [Marsh] was naturally gratified over the light thrown on geological history by his western discoveries, for among the specimens acquired were many forms which filled gaps in the paleontological series."(FN24)

It may be the heady assertions on the proof of evolution that led Huxley to an act of professional parody when, in 1876, he made a drawing of his "idea of eohippus" (the prehistoric horse) then added a prehistoric human "rider," and, at Marsh's prompting, named him "eohomo." Fearing that this episode might be taken too seriously, Grinnell, who gives us the only record of the incident, insisted that "The layman must understand that all this was pure fun; that the name eohomo does not exist; that in the geological horizon from which eohippus comes no tailless apes have yet been found. The whole thing was fun, and is not to be taken seriously."(FN25) Nonetheless, it is impossible to resist. This is, after all, clearly play to displace the possibility of play, or, to paraphrase Grinnell: "This is all play, there is no play."

Huxley's drawing indicates that whatever Marsh's contribution to proving evolution in the case of the horse, the real subject is human evolution. The horse was drawn first, and the rider to match. Notice the distinct similarities in the hands and feet, hair and mane, and even facial expression. Both are missing links, the human derived out of the empirical evidence of the equine. Grinnell wrote: "As [Huxley] talked, he began to sketch with his pencil on a sheet of brown paper, and presently said, 'that is my idea of eohippus.'"(FN26) The respective forms are derived by Huxley so effortlessly because he is already familiar with them. They are central confirmations of what Balibar, as cited above, names an "always already" present narrative structure, or more exactly, invention of structure. Without these two there is no veracity to the theory of evolution.

It is useful to recall Derrida, who writes of "structure" in the human sciences: "The center is at the center of the totality, and yet because the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center. The concept of the centered structure is contradictorily coherent. And as always, coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a desire."(FN27) This absent center has the crucial function of denying play:

The function of this center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure . . . but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure. By orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total form. And even today the notion of structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself.

Nevertheless, the center also closes off the play which it opens up and makes possible.(FN28)

Huxley's "play" is inseparable from the anxiety it produced in Grinnell, who, at some level, understood that the presence at the center of evolutionary theory, the "missing link" that provided narrative coherence, was play. By having his theorization of the missing link take such a form, Huxley made it possible, indeed necessary, to deny that there was any play at all. Here the scientist assumes or invents the center: Huxley manufactures the crucial figure of human evolutionary trajectory from unrelated evidence. Doing it as a joke, as a form of play, acknowledges the gross speculation, but jeopardizes less the "theory" to which the figure is central, than the professional status of the scientist who at once invents and exposes the "scientific" speculation. Grinnell heroically resumes the task of centering the threat which the joke introduces not by defending the speculation, which in fact he lets stand (he does say they found

no such “men” but does not discredit the idea that they existed), but by centering the scientist, assuring us all it was only a joke: such speculation is not science, authority is intact.

But if Derrida is correct, if such a contradiction does indeed express the force of a desire, then what is the nature of the desire? What is its history and its object? As I have suggested, the desire is for a narrative both proving and justifying historical completion, needing both origin and goal.(FN29) Accordingly, a void, or absent center, is absolutely necessary, for it permits the introduction of invention. The nagging absence of the “missing link” is exploited by the scientist who is functioning, as Bruno Latour has explained, in a characteristically “modern” fashion, functioning to mediate between things and understanding while erasing his mediation. As Latour explains, “the [scientist’s] task is to separate and purify truth from belief, natural from social. . . . Yet . . . this separation is entirely productive: the more the [scientist] separates the mixed middle ground of the world into the rarefied zones of pure nature and pure culture, the more does the translation of nature into culture and culture into nature fill the empty middle ground with their hybrid offspring.”(FN30) In Latour’s terms Huxley’s joke polluted science, and Grinnell’s response to the joke bears Latour out. Yet what the drawing most crucially discloses, in the utterly social form of a joke, is precisely the “central” presence of the socially inscribed scientist in the production of a consensus that is both scientific and social, or, national.

Huxley’s drawing points to the Native American—if we are to pay any respect to geography—as the crucial link in the narrative chain of evolution. This status—the Indian as subject of biological beginnings—serves a double function for nineteenth-century expansionist ideology. It at once determines the Native’s atavism, his or her pastness, thus, in a country obsessed by progress, greatly justifying extermination; furthermore, it facilitates a vacillation between biology and culture where the Indian both offers evidence of species evolution and is mined as a resource for defining an exclusive national identity.(FN31) This delimitation and appropriation of identity is inseparable from territorial appropriation. Thus Marsh, who provides the hard evidence of biological evolution, has a student, Grinnell, who becomes a highly respected anthropologist through his study of Native culture.(FN32) The life and work of Grinnell—a paleontologist, natural history essayist, ornithologist, ethnographer, and explorer—discloses the details of the often hermetic conjunction of science, the frontier experience, and American nationalist imperialism.

If Grinnell is remembered at all it is usually as the founder of the first Audubon Society, in 1886, or for his two-volume monograph on the Cheyenne, a work cited by later anthropologists, including Margaret Mead, as the most accurate available record of the everyday life of the Cheyenne.(FN33) Yet Grinnell could cite many accomplishments. He accompanied Custer on the 1874 expedition into the Black Hills and was with Captain William Ludlow on his 1875 foray into the Yellowstone region and Yellowstone National Park. He also made frequent trips to the West to do ethnographic work, to hunt elk, or to buy land as a prospective rancher. Grinnell received a doctorate from Yale under the direction of Marsh. It was as part of Marsh’s scientific expedition of 1870, while he was still a graduate student, that Grinnell made his first trip to the West.

Grinnell shared much with Marsh besides an interest in paleontology. In fact, they both belonged to “old” American families. A biographer describes Grinnell (formerly Granell) as a “direct descendant of Mayflower stock,” while Marsh is traced to “the Marsh family living within the bounds of old Salem, Massachusetts [from 1636 to 1881].”(FN34) They were both, according to the standards of contemporaneous nativist discourse, preeminently “native” Americans—that is, white northern Europeans with

ancestors born in the United States. It is no small irony that posterity has defined Marsh and Grinnell as early champions of indigenous Americans. Marsh's credentials in this regard primarily rest on his 1874 fossil expedition to the Black Hills, when "Marsh was twice driven back by the Sioux Indians, who supposed him to be searching for gold rather than for bones."(FN35) Perhaps the Sioux were familiar with Marsh's first publication, "The Gold of Nova Scotia," which had appeared thirteen years earlier in the *American Journal of Science* (Grinnell himself claims that "after 1867 [Marsh's] active [?] interest in minerals ceased"(FN36). In 1874 Marsh met with Red Cloud "and other chiefs," and was given permission to enter and excavate in the Hills on the condition that he take Sioux complaints to Washington. Marsh, in fact, did this, and even helped to expose the many frauds among Indian agencies, precipitating the "Indian Ring" scandal that was resolved to the detriment of the Agencies, though not necessarily to the benefit of the Indians. Red Cloud is reported to have later referred to Marsh as the only white man he ever met who kept his promises.(FN37)

Grinnell's position according to some contemporary Native Americans may be suggested by the fact that the only biography available on him was written under support from the George Bird Grinnell Indian Children's Foundation, an institution set up in his name by his nephew and Indian educators. His biographer writes: "George Bird Grinnell saw his first Cheyenne Indian when he was 20 years old, and before he was 40 had begun to be influential in arresting the move toward the total destruction of the nation's Native American population."(FN38) Grinnell's writings about Native peoples are voluminous; they include ethnographies, hunting stories, stories for children, and many translations/transcriptions of Native oral literature and knowledge.

Grinnell even made claims that he had been adopted by the Blackfeet for the work he did in securing them a fair price for their land when they were forced to sell. Grinnell was, in fact, the motivating force behind organizing the purchase of the territory, which soon became Glacier National Park, containing the famous Grinnell Glacier. Mark David Spence has recently given the contradictory dynamics of Grinnell's role in the northern Rockies some of the attention it deserves in his essay on Indian exclusion from Glacier National Park. Spence writes,

While Grinnell linked the rapid exploitation of Western lands with the destruction of native societies, his attempts to preserve some remnant of each epitomized late-nineteenth-century concepts of wilderness as uninhabited and Indian culture as vanishing. As a result, his efforts to preserve Blackfeet culture and some portion of the tribe's homeland took widely divergent courses: the Blackfeet would live on in his books and museum collections, but their mountain wilderness would persist within the boundaries of a national park.(FN39)

Thus demonstrating one of the principal, if hidden, functions of America's national parks, Spence rightly concludes that if "recognized, Blackfeet [land] claims would make plain that the American wilderness ideal is predicted on Indian dispossession.(FN40)

The various ideals of the complex discourse of American "nature" are founded on, even while they obscure, manifold appropriations. For instance, by seeing that the Blackfeet received 1.5 million dollars (not in cash but in goods, to assure dependency) for a vast territory, Grinnell was symbolically made (or, at least as likely, made himself) Indian, and the American "public" was given a national symbolic "natural" space from which the Indian, though not Grinnell, was excluded. In Fichtean language, the external borders of the United States were advanced while those of the Blackfeet were dismantled; furthermore, an agent of the United States largely responsible for the territorial acquisition compromised and appropriated the internal borders of Blackfeet identity. Grinnell's scientific training under Marsh provided the basis of his "familiarity" with the Blackfeet—his cultural knowledge facilitated his appropriation of both Blackfeet

identity and land. The process in turn elaborated a nationalist identity through the creation of a national park, or, in other words, it contributed to the nationalist insistence that “the ‘external frontiers’ of the state . . . become the ‘internal frontiers.’”(FN41) One function of such a “national” park, I submit, was to help render cognate the nation and its “people.” Balibar writes that “external frontiers have to be imagined constantly as a projection and protection of an internal collective personality, which each of us carries within ourselves and enables us to inhabit the space of the state as a place where we have always been—and always will be—‘at home.’”(FN42) In Glacier National Park—that is, the home of the Blackfeet—an “American” could be “at home,” even as, or precisely because, the Blackfeet were rendered homeless. Native familiarity—becoming a member of the Blackfeet family—provided the European American with both a history and a place.

In the following section I briefly sketch occasions, both historical and contemporary, of manifold Native appropriations in the constitution of an exclusive national geography and identity. My description is intended to be suggestive—by no means exhaustive—of the “nation’s” persistent history of violating simultaneously the external and internal borders of Native peoples and by such an operation confusing the grounds of identity on which the resistance of colonized subjects rests.

2.

Gary Snyder, whose work appears centrally in the canons of the burgeoning field of ecocriticism,(FN43) in 1974 declared, or declared again, the “old/new name” for North America: “Turtle Island.”(FN44) Snyder draws the metaphor from an Iroquois creation story and asserts that it is “based on many creation myths of the people who have been living here for millennia.”(FN45) The nomination “Turtle Island,” for Snyder, refigures America as a place; for him “the ‘U.S.A.’ and its states and counties are arbitrary and inaccurate impositions on what is really here.”(FN46) Turtle Island, which is the title of Snyder’s volume, is intended to “speak of place, and the energy-pathways that sustain life.”(FN47) The figurative recasting of America’s “external borders” likewise requires that Snyder alter his internal borders, or, as his poems suggest, it requires that he reimagine himself as Native.

First, in the poem “I Went into the Maverick Bar,” Snyder at once faces and disavows a rural working-class past: “I went into the Maverick bar . . . / And drank double shots of bourbon / backed with beer. / My long hair was tucked up under a cap / I’d left the earring in the car.”(FN48) Snyder must hide the signs of his new identity, ironically becoming what he “was” only to proclaim, albeit with some ambivalence, its profanity: “I recalled when I worked in the woods / and the bars of Madras, Oregon. / The short-haired joy and roughness—/ America—/ your stupidity.” At the end of the poem the speaker leaves the “Maverick Bar,” returning to “the shadow of bluffs / [where] I came back to myself.” The “shadow of bluffs” references an earlier poem, “Anasazi,” which articulates the birth of Natives, or the place where internal and external borders are unified and complete: “women / birthing / at the foot of ladders in the dark, / trickling streams in hidden canyons / under the cold rolling desert / corn-basket wide-eyed / red baby / rock lip home, /Anasazi.”(FN49) Thus Snyder elaborates the birth, or rebirth, of America’s first peoples, to whom he would have himself belong.

In a recent attempt to revitalize the “Turtle Island” metaphor, Snyder suggests that all inhabitants on the continent undergo an analogous transformation. He writes: “Ultimately we can all lay claim to the term native and the songs and dances, the beads and feathers, and the profound responsibilities that go with it,” and continues: “Native Americans to be sure have a prior claim to the term native. But as they love

this land they will welcome the conversions of millions of immigrant psyches into fellow 'Native Americans.'" As it would follow from the theorization I provide above, many Native Americans have responded with hostility to Snyder's nominal challenge that they "welcome" such "fellows" into their communities.

Leslie Marmon Silko observes that white writers, most notably Snyder, who turn to Indian materials do so "in an attempt to remake themselves, and to obliterate their white, middle-class origins"; further, they perpetuate "the assumption that the white man, through some innate cultural or racial superiority, has the ability to perceive and master the essential beliefs, values and emotions of persons from Native American communities."(FN50) The Hopi activist and poet Wendy Rose writes, about the bald cultural appropriation of "going native": "The assumption of (native) status by non-native whites is part of a process of 'cultural imperialism' directly related to other claims on Native American land and lives."(FN51) Pam Colorado, an Oneida scholar, elaborates: "The process is ultimately intended to supplant Indians, even in areas of their own customs and spirituality. In the end, non-Indians will have complete power over what is and is not Indian, even for Indians. We are talking here about an absolute ideological/conceptual subordination of Indian people in addition to the total physical subordination [we] already experience. . . . NonIndians will then 'own' our heritage and ideas as thoroughly as they now claim to own our land and resources."(FN52) Of Gary Snyder, Silko says that appropriating Native materials is tantamount to the illegal expropriation of Native lands; Snyder, she writes, "is occupying stolen property."(FN53)

Snyder's is an appropriation of identity without the experience of community—the very experience which presumably constitutes "internal borders"—according to terms like those offered by Raymond Williams in his discussions of the British industrialization of Wales, where solidarity is formed "out of . . . the most bitter and brutal struggles."(FN54) Or, as Williams writes elsewhere, "real social identities [are formed] by working and living together, with some real place and common interest to identify with."(FN55) Thus, when the young Spokane Indian in Sherman Alexie's (Spokane/Coeur d'Alene) novel *Reservation Blues* hears the music of two white women, who, in their "imagined community" wear beads and follow "Native" spiritual models, he recognizes the unlimited nature of his loss:

Thomas hit the eject button, threw the cassette on the floor and stomped on it. He pulled the tape ribbon from its casing until it spread over the kitchen like pasta. Using a dull knife, he sliced the tape ribbon into pieces. Then he ran around his house, grabbing photos and souvenirs, afraid that somebody was going to steal them next. He had photographs of his mother and father, a Disneyland cup even though he'd never been there, a few letters and cards. He gathered them all into a pile on the kitchen table and waited.(FN56)

It may be that identity is being (re)claimed and defended by these Native critics in a fashion that belies their own insecurities about their identity; in fact, Alexie's most recent work explicitly engages this suggestion.(FN57) James Clifford, in a work that grew out of the 1976 case of *Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp.*, demonstrates how tribal identity may be reclaimed as part of a legal strategy for political control of land and resources; that is, he suggests how "internal borders" may be "discovered" by native peoples themselves to resist social and political encroachments that tend to violate historically secure "external borders."(FN58) The Mashpee lost their case because they failed successfully to define their tribal status according to the 1901 case of *Montoya v. United States*, a suit drawn by an Apache band that had endured only a fraction of the social and economic pressures of national incorporation endured by the Mashpee. Significantly, the Apache looked and acted like stereotypical "Indians," while the Mashpee owned homes and businesses and generally seemed to have earned many

benefits from a willing participation in dominant social and economic practices. Of course, some elements distinguish the Mashpee and Native critics from those like Gary Snyder. Native critics like Alexie, Rose, and Colorado are enrolled tribal members; they have legal status as Native people. There is, inseparably, the experience of community; as Clifford writes, “no one contested the fact that before the 1960s Mashpee was governed by Indians” who represented the majority population of “Cape Cod’s Indian Town.”(FN59) Thus, asserting a Native identity in these cases is a defensive reaction to encroachments on legally or historically established experiences and practices. Because of the absence of such legal and historical qualifications the identity claims of someone like Snyder are necessarily aggressive rather than defensive.

Gary Snyder’s *Dances with Wolves*-like mimicry goes far toward criticizing the general emancipatory possibilities of cross-dressing celebrated by Marjorie Garber and some other critics of race and gender bending,(FN60) and, more importantly for my purposes, it has a powerful ideological history in the United States, a history that exposes such appropriations in the nationalist work of scientific founding and territorial expropriation. I am referring here to the origins of a major branch of anthropological science in America, a science as deeply involved in mapping an evolutionary trajectory toward American perfection as zoological paleontology.

Historian Curtis Hinsley has traced a crucial moment in the genesis of the American Bureau of Ethnology, American anthropology, and the Smithsonian Institute to an 1845 lecture by Henry Rowe Schoolcraft titled, “An Address Delivered before the Was-Ah Ho-de No Son-Ne, or, the New Confederacy of the Iroquois.”(FN61) Addressing a group of white men in Rochester, New York, who literally wore the costume of the Iroquois—only recently violently displaced from the very region—Schoolcraft exhorted his fellow members to study and emulate the Native as a means of defining and building an imperialist national identity. The Iroquois were to be a model of imperialist virtue: “Their character was formed on the military principle, and to acquire distinction in this line, they roved over half the continent. They literally carried their conquests from the gulf of St. Lawrence to the gulf of Mexico. Few nations have ever existed, who have evinced more indomitable courage or hardihood, or shown more devotion to the spirit of independence than the Iroquois.”(FN62) I should stress, this is at once an inventive celebration and a calling: “Symbolically,” Schoolcraft tells his audience, “you re-create the race.”(FN63) “No people,” he adds, “can bear a true nationality, which does not exfoliate, as it were, from its bosom, something that expresses the peculiarities of its own soil and climate.”(FN64) Wild American “nature,” Schoolcraft repeatedly announces, was in turn the Indian’s source of imperial virtue. As if reformulating Thoreau’s pronouncement that in wilderness was the preservation of the world, Schoolcraft announces that in wilderness was the potential for the nation.

The New Confederacy of the Iroquois was founded and organized by another eminent early American ethnographer, Lewis Henry Morgan, in 1842. In his recent history of “playing Indian,” Philip J. Deloria notes that “beginning with Romantic notions of vanishing Indians, Morgan’s New Confederacy . . . eventually turned from nostalgia toward rationalized, objective scientific investigation.”(FN65) In their quest to become “authentically” Native, the members of the New Confederacy (membership peaked at about 400) explored all the available knowledge of Indian peoples; they were eventually forced to confront the fact that Indians had not, in fact, gone away. Very many “real” Indians still existed and they could even be “objectively” studied. Morgan announced to some new members that they should “[S]eek out and treasure of whatever remains to you of the Oneidas; of the manners, customs, and history; of their government, mythology and literature and especially preserve the vestiges and relics

of their civilization,”(FN66) providing the new members with a research agenda to facilitate the perfection of their emulation.

Schoolcraft concluded his “Address” to the New Confederacy with the following: “The tomb that holds a man derives all of its moral interest from the man, and would be destitute of it, without him. America is the tomb of the Red man.”(FN67) According to Schoolcraft, the only good “real” Indian acts as fertilizer, “exfoliating” American national culture. Eight days after delivering this address Schoolcraft sent to the struggling Smithsonian an outline for American ethnology, a science “to enable us to appreciate and understand our position on the globe.”(FN68) In the event, it could also help to expand “our” position on the globe. Schoolcraft “went Native” as an imperialist scientist in the service of the nation. Schoolcraft and Morgan provide the precedent to recent appropriations, by Snyder and others, of idealized versions of Native culture and identity. The appropriation by culturally and politically “conscious” whites of Native identity was, and remains, inseparable from the violent appropriation of Native land. In the interest of making explicit the affinity of the interests of the New Confederacy and Snyder’s call to the conversion of the “immigrants” who inhabit “Turtle Island” it is worth noting that they both imagine and appropriate Iroquois materials; they both draw from the indigenous confederacy that provided American lawmakers with an inspiration and a model for a democratic union of states.

In America, natural history, whether applied to the fossils of birds and horses or the real and invented fossilization—which is to say extermination—of a multitude of Native cultures, enables and discloses a nationalist ethos of exclusionary coherence which scripts others out of the national narrative by elaborating a universal subject whose hegemony is formed and maintained through his idealizations and appropriations of Native identities. In nineteenth-century America the study of natural history and Native Americans constituted a subject which advanced the enabling myth of national progress and identity: the justification and the act of territorial appropriation removing and obscuring the most serious obstacles to national expansion.

Fichte, to end where I began, occupies an equivocal position for, if he did formulate ideas exploited by totalitarianism, he did so under the duress of Napoleonic defeat and occupation. In what Balibar has rightly described as a beautiful passage,(FN69) Fichte begs “German people” to maintain their “internal borders” before the fact of the compromised external one (I quote only a brief portion of the passage): “We are defeated. . . . [O]ur safest measure will be to go our own way in all things, as if we were alone with ourselves, and not to establish any relation that is not laid upon us by absolute necessity . . . [and] to look upon any favor from foreigners as a disgrace and a dishonor.”(FN70) Not only dishonor, but the end of the end that began in military defeat—the internal borders, those which contain the individual who in turn contains, somehow, the “meaning” of the people or the nation, are the last. So it is that the favors of Gary Snyder, or any “wild” hero of America, are refused so often by the objects of their attention (even Kevin Costner, or, rather, “Dances with Wolves,” receives only the affections of a white woman)—and so will such insistent “generosity” be inveighed. In every border crossing there is a border compromised.

#### ADDED MATERIAL

STEPHEN GERMIC

Michigan State University

Fig. 1. “Eohippus and Eohomo”; rpt. in George Bird Grinnell, “Otheniel Marsh,” in *Leading American Men of Science*, ed. David Starr Jordan (New York: Holt, 1910).

## FOOTNOTES

1. "Geneva, 1977: A Report on the Hemispheric Movement of Indigenous Peoples," in Akwesasne Notes, ed., Basic Call to Consciousness (Summertown, Tenn.: Book Publishing Company, 1978), 38.
2. *Ibid.*, 80.
3. See Hans Kohn, *Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967), 229-46; George Frederick Kneller, *The Educational Philosophy of National Socialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 82-96.
4. S. D. Stirk, *The Prussian Spirit: A Survey of German Literature and Politics, 1914-1940* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1941), 172. Paul R. Sweet has critiqued the charge of Fichte's anti-Semitism, see "Fichte and the Jews: A Case of Tension between Civil Rights and Human Rights," *German Studies Review* 16 (1993): 37-48.
5. Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Weidenfield, 1968), 39.
6. *Ibid.*, 44.
7. Vine Deloria, *Custer Died for Your Sins* (New York: MacMillan, 1969), 179.
8. The "state" is not synonymous with the "nation." The former refers specifically to ruling interests; the state is the collusion of political power and the dominant class. The nation is an abstract invention, though, like ideology, it facilitates material effects that usually benefit relevant social and political institutions and figures.
9. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, trans. R. F. Jones and G. H. Turnbull (Chicago: Open Court, 1922), 223-24.
10. *Ibid.*, 54.
11. Elie Kedouri, *Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993).
12. *Ibid.*, 68-69.
13. Noah Webster, *Dissertations on the English Language* (Boston: Isaiah and Thomas, 1789), 397.
14. Richard M. Rollins, "Words as Social Control: Noah Webster and the Creation of the American Dictionary," *American Quarterly* 28 (1976): 416-30.
15. *Ibid.*, 420.
16. *Ibid.*, 421.
17. Recently there is the Official English movement that formally began with Sen. S.I. Hayakawa's 1982 proposal to make English the official language of the United States. This movement has realized remarkable success, playing on and playing up racist and anti-immigrant sentiments. The history and issues of Official English are covered well in Juan F. Perea, ed., *Immigrant Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
18. Etienne Balibar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology," in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1991), 87
19. *Ibid.*, 86.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Quoted in George Bird Grinnell, "Otheniel Charles Marsh: Paleontologist," in *Leading American Men of Science*, ed. David Starr Jordan (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1910), 294.
22. Quoted in *ibid.*, 301-2.
23. Quoted in *ibid.*, 301.
24. *Ibid.*, 298-99.
25. *Ibid.*, 295-96.
26. *Ibid.*, 295.

27. Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 279.
28. *Ibid.*, 278-79.
29. For an account of how "beginnings" provide a kind of narrative certainty of form, structure, and meaning, see Edward W. Said, *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (New York: Basic Books, 1975). More recently, Terence Martin has discussed the American need to "wipe the slate clean" for the imagination and reiteration of a moment that "establish[es] the conditions for a national identity" (*Parables of Possibility: The American Need for Beginnings* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1995], xii).
30. Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 10-11.
31. The most extensive account of nationalist appropriations of Native identity is Philip J. Deloria, *Playing Indian* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Deloria's crucial point, that "playing Indian represented, evaded, and perpetuated [radically unequal relations of power]," and that it was "one of the foundations for imagining and performing domination and power in America" (186) is absolutely germane to my discussion. Rather than emphasize the political stakes and complexities of performativity, I seek to identify a pattern of Native appropriations foundational to American discourses of natural history and cultural expression.
32. See George Bird Grinnell, *The Passing of the Great West: Selected Papers of George Bird Grinnell*, ed. John F. Reiger (New York: Winchester Press, 1972), 2.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Cynthia Parsons, *George Bird Grinnell: A Biographical Sketch* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1992), 25; Grinnell, "Marsh," 283.
35. Grinnell, "Marsh," 294.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.* Red Cloud was prone to capitulation as a means for gaining personal power and did not represent majority Sioux interest in the region.
38. Parsons, Grinnell, 93.
39. Mark David Spence, "Crown of the Continent, Backbone of the World: The American Wilderness Ideal and Blackfeet Exclusion from Glacier National Park," *Environmental History* 1.3 (July 1996): 33.
40. *Ibid.*, 42.
41. Balibar, "Nation," 95.
42. *Ibid.*
43. See Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm, eds., *The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 397. Gary Snyder was the keynote speaker for the 1997 meeting of the Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment.
44. Gary Snyder, *Turtle Island* (New York: New Directions, 1974).
45. *Ibid.*, unnumbered page.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*, 9.
49. *Ibid.*, 3.
50. Leslie Marmon Silko, "An Old-Time Indian Attack Conducted in Two Parts: Part One, Imitation 'Indian' Poems; Part Two, Gary Snyder's *Turtle Island*," in *The Remembered Earth*, ed. Geary Hobson (Albuquerque: Red Earth Press, 1978), 211-12.
51. Wendy Rose, "The Great Pretenders: Further Reflections of Whiteshamanism," in *State of Native America*, 404.

52. Quoted in *ibid.*, 405. See also, Ward Churchill, *Fantasies of the Master Race: Literature, Cinema, and the Colonization of American Indians* (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1992), 163-230.
53. Silko, "Indian Attack," 215.
54. Raymond Williams, *Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism* (London: Verso, 1989), 115.
55. Raymond Williams, *The Year 2000* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 196. I introduce Williams here because I believe his ideas on place and identity have been largely misunderstood as compromising his frequent critiques of nationalism. I am suggesting that Williams occupied an awkward national position similar to that of "occupied" peoples, i.e., Native Americans. A review of Williams's ideas on these issues, which takes account of his biography, can be found in Donald M. Nonini, "Race, Land, Nation: A(t)-Tribute to Raymond Williams," *Cultural Critique* (1999): 158-83.
56. Sherman Alexie, *Reservation Blues* (New York: Warner Books, 1995), 296.
57. Sherman Alexie, *The Toughest Indian in the World* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000).
58. James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).
59. *Ibid.*, 277.
60. See Anne McClintok, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 132-80; Eric Lott, *Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
61. Curtis Hinsley, *Savages and Scientists: The Smithsonian Institution and the Development of American Anthropology, 1846-1910* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981), 21-22.
62. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, *An Address, Delivered Before the Was-ah-Ho-de-no-son-ne, Or New Confederacy of the Iroquois, at Its Third Annual Council, August 14, 1846* (Rochester: Jerome and Bros., 1846), 8.
63. *Ibid.*, 5.
64. *Ibid.*, 20.
65. Deloria, *Playing*, 73.
66. Lewis Henry Morgan, "Proclamation Instituting the Wolf Tribe of the Oneidas," December 4, 1844, quoted in Deloria, *Playing*, 82.
67. Schoolcraft, "Address," 29.
68. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, *Plan for the Investigation of American Ethnology: to include the facts derived from other parts of the globe, and the eventual formation of a Museum of Antiquities and the Peculiar Fabrics of Nations: and also the collections of a library of the Philology of the World, manuscript and printed* (New York, 1846).
69. Etienne Balibar, *Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 63.
70. Fichte, 236.