1	Peace Building and Conflict Resolution Stuart J. Kaufman Prepared for conference, “Living Together After Ethnic Killing: Debating the Kaufmann Hypothesis”
2	Theory matters – this is an argument for a process for achieving peace/lessening ethnic conflict
3	Chaim Kaufmann’s argument in favor of partition as necessary for conflict resolution is primarily based on two arguments about structure. First, within each ethnic group, ethnic civil war puts extremists in power, so social structures with groups can be used to prevent the emergence of new political structures that can protect all ethnic groups. Second, ethnic civil war creates a security dilemma which makes it impossible for the groups to trust each other, further blocking the emergence of trans-ethnic political institutions.2
4	The contrary argument, exemplified by a recent article by Barbara Walter, essentially accepts this part of Kaufmann’s argument, but claims that the structural problems, especially the security dilemma, can be overcome by effective third-party guarantees.3 Acceptance of this argument then leads to another debate, over the proper terms for structuring a multiethnic state, whether consociationalism, federalism, or other electoral schemes.
5	Paradigms of conflict resolution Structuralist Kaufman argues that a focus on structure only overlooks the main obstacle to the resolution of ethnic war: not structure, but preferences. Social psychological – must include not only attitudes but preferences the source of these preferences is not only cognitive but also emotional, and the tools politicians use to appeal to these preferences are emotion-laden symbols. Focus on preference formation and change Demonstrates the importance of tools for changing preferences Individual and group psychology important The real key to conflict resolution, then, is to change mass preferences.
6	Ethnic identities Primoldialist Instrumentalist Constructivist
7	Ethnic wars due to: Ethnic fears Security dilemma Result of state breakdown? Kaufman says no, state breakdown is usually a result, not cause, of security dilemma Why, then, do ethnic groups’ goals become mutually hostile enough to cause security dilemmas? [9] Behavior of ethnic elites “big lie” – manipulation of information by elites Ancient hatreds Kaufman disagrees
8	What is needed is an account of how elite appeals interact with mass attitudes in driving ethnic relations to war, or in maintaining ethnic peace. Symbolic politics theory of ethnic war [10] Cognitive effects – frame an issue Emotional effects Taps values and emotions simultaneously Hostile attitudes as a barrier to ethnic conflict resolution Popular sentiment - mass Group promotion - leadership
9	Proposed solutions Partition (Chaim Kaufmann & others) Change preferences – Dilemma: On the one hand, mediators, the representatives of sovereign governments outside those party to the conflict, cannot legitimately intervene so openly in the parties’ internal conflict as to restructure their media or rewrite their school curricula. On the other hand, failure to address these problems likely means failure to establish a sustainable peace. [ 15] Solution: Governments support IGOs and NGOs toward Peace-building Rebuilds relationships between communities and members of communities Reconceptualizing a conflict as a shared problem demanding a shared solution [18] Conflict transformation
10	Solutions Diplomacy – formal government Track II diplomacy – elite, unofficial groups Middle-range – middle-range officials and organizations – opinion leaders, regional elites Problem solving workshops Grass-roots – local individuals – influence through PR campaigns direct interpersonal activities
11	Problems [20] Need culturally appropriate mechanisms NGO conflict and overlap “re-entry problem” Difficult in middle of armed conflict Makes programmatic suggestions