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5	Liberalization and Ethnic Conflict in Latin America Alison Brysk and Carol Wise Written in 1995 Propositions: 1. Ethnic identity is a socially rooted phenomenon which can be catalyzed by changes in both economic and political conditions. 2. 1982 debt crisis was a main triggering event Aim of article This article analyzes the relationship between economic adjustment and increasing levels of indigenous mobilization in Latin America.
6	Two major variables (pp. 77-78) Type of adjustment to economic crisis Macroeconomic measures Delay? – most costly Rapid, “shock” implementation? More gradually? Overlook effects on mobilizing ethnic groups Institutional opportunities available for expressing and channeling economic and political demands
7	Further Impacts of change affect different sectors of a nation differently Rural and informal sector most vulnerable Context – growing ethnic identification (pp. 77-78)
8	Macro-economic adjustment Changes in policies regarding Money supply (credit and interest rates) State ownership of economic enterprises Private v. communal ownership of land Trade Social investments
9	"The availability of government" The availability of government, opposition party, grassroots, and extrasystemic channels will determine both the incidence of mobilization and the scope and form of expression of a grievance (p. 78). Compares Bolivia, Peru, Mexico
10	Thesis – re. Institutional channels The availability of government, opposition party, grassroots, and extrasystemic will determine both the incidence of mobilization and the scope and form of expression of a grievance.
11	The availability of government, opposition party, grassroots, and extrasystemic channels Government channels
12	The availability of government, opposition party, grassroots, and extrasystemic channels Government channels: Debt crisis with attendant hyperinflation undermined prior governing alliances and coalitions Economic Adjustment (EA) policies strengthened executive autonomy
13	The availability of government, opposition party, grassroots, and extrasystemic channels Opposition party channels Space for peaceful expression of popular and indigenous demands through political parties – whether expanded or narrowed
14	The availability of government, opposition party, grassroots, and extrasystemic channels Grassroots channels Space for popular organizations and NGOs to operate – expanded or narrowed
15	The availability of government, opposition party, grassroots, and extrasystemic channels Extrasystemic channels
16	Two major variables (p. 78) Type of adjustment to economic crisis Institutional opportunities available for expressing and channeling economic and political demands Political institutions and channels are key factors conditioning the mobilizing effect of relative deprivation Existing political institutions are State organizations Class-based opposition parties Urban-biased elections Adjustment process narrows space for peaceful expression of demands
17	Method of presentation Present overview of situation and grievances of indigenous people in Latin America, highlighting common factors Analyze magnitude of economic crisis Policy responses Social consequences of adjustment Compare modes of incorporation channels for political participation Patterns of ethnic mobilization Review collective lessons Implications for state policy
18	3 Countries compared (p. 79) Peru – ethnicity suppressed, sitgmatized, stratified Bolivia – Indian communities have majoritarian consciousness based in geographic and political centrality Mexico – Indian identity both repressed and coopted through indigenismo – celebrates Indian past, denies its present
19	Dates of revolutions with agrarian reform Mexico – 1910-20 Bolivia – 1952 – nationalized mines and minerals Peru – 1968 NOTE: Very different historic periods
20	Indian Rights Movements – 1970s Created by indigenous activists and their allies (p. 79) Sought: Land rights Relief from human rights abuses Preservation of native languages & cultural practices autonomy
21	Historical background
22	Arrangement of power 1960s-1970s p. 88 Modernizing military (1964-69) Peasants with rights to traditional lands Allied with government 1964-1970 (ended with Banzar government, rise of Katarismo) Unionized workers in State-owned mines
23	Shift in 1970s p. 89 Opening of Amazon Development of coca production Opening of lowland indigenous lands Settlement Timber concessions Indigenous rights movement in lowlands joined with Kataristas in highlands
24	Background – Oil Cartel
25	Latin America’s “Lost Decade” – 1980s Erosion of agricultural reform Growing world market for drugs Debt-backed development programs brought into the Amazon Displaced highland peasants National oil companies Multinational timber concerns
26	Latin America’s “Lost Decade” – 1980s Rural crisis Unfavorable food pricing policies Permanent migration to urban shantytowns Seasonal migration to plantations International migration (Argentina for Bolivians)
27	Latin America’s “Lost Decade” – 1980s Cuts in social services Food subsidies Rural clinics – regressed to 200 deaths per 1000 infants, life expectancy of 50 years. Bilingual education – regressed to 50% illiteracy
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29	Latin America’s “Lost Decade” – 1980s Demise of Bolivia’s state capitalist model Dependent on foreign financing Debt crisis caused its collapse “Solution” – print money à hyperinflation Each attempt at stabilization à popular protests generally led by Bolivian workers’ confederation
30	Latin America’s “Lost Decade” – 1980s – popular responses Bolivia – political turmoil Peru – Revolutionary movements, esp. Sendero Luminosa – Maoist Mexico – political turmoil, in Chiapas, Zapatistas – armed peasant movement
31	Bolivia - New Economic Policy - 1985 Victor Paz Estenssoro elected President Assembled team of technocrats Adopted full IMF program Established experimental World Bank-funded Emergency Social Fund (ESF) Masterful politician – Created new alliances and coalitions
32	Structural Adjustment – IMF prescriptions (Table 1, p. 80) Tight monetary policy Free public prices Unify exchange rates (managed exchange rates) of foreign currencies Trade liberalization – remove tariffs Tax reform Renegotiation of external debt Privatization Emergency Social Fund – launched 1985
33	Estenssoro’s political strategy Forged pact with Congressional opposition Demobilized organized labor through massive layoffs in mining and state sectors Courted large (rural) indigenous constituency – now a core of the revolutionary coalition
34	Effects Sharp decline in per capita GDP 1985-86, then moderate recuperation Share of state resources devoted to education, health, and welfare services declined (except bi-lingual education, with decentralization of education services). External debt was serviced
35	Distribution of pain Bottom 20 percent of income pyramid bore disproportionate amount of adjustment costs. – Largely indigenous Poorly educated Subject of racial discrimination
36	Effects on rural peoples Privatization of land led to land loss 90% of land à 7% of population High interest rates Tight credit Drastic cuts in public investment for public infrastructure
37	Emergency Social Fund (ESF) Temporary (became permanent) entity entirely independent of State structure “Demand-driven” – granting process Projects executed by supervised private sub-contractors Economic and social infrastructure Social assistance Production support $180 million fund, grew to $239.5 million in foreign resources, mostly grants
38	Effects of ESF Symbolic – ameliorated political conflict Strengthened participation of NGOs in Bolivian civil society
39	Why Bolivian movements have been relatively peaceful 1952 revolution incorporated miners and peasants into governing structure through state-sponsored unions Ruling party consistently favored (even mobilized) Indian peasants over more militant and independent Indian miners [p. 88] Katarismo developed a “dual analysis of class and ethnic exploitation” – “seeing with both eyes” [p. 89]
40	Why Bolivian movements have been relatively peaceful Catholic Church has been supportive of demands for social justice Transnational Indian rights groups and indigenist advocates have supported Bolivia’s indigenous organizations [p. 90]
41	Government attempts at accommodation – 1990s – difficult to implement (note-post-Estenssoro) Decentralization proposals linked with indigenous demands for local autonomy, bilingual and intercutlural education, and increases in rural social services and local budgets. Promised no rise in fuel prices Forbade forced coca eradication
42	Conflict Political liberalization vs. economic liberalization April 1995 – State of Seige declared “Won’t this brutally excluding neoliberal model oblige us to seek solutions of force and violence? Will the march of indigenous peoples resolve the problem of dignity and cultural identity? Currently, the form of political representation of the [Indian] nationalities in this society is pressure.” (Cuadros 1991). [p. 90]
43	Policy matters [pp. 98-99] Education investment Rural property rights Some preservation of communal Indian lands (esp. Mexico and Peru) Vigorous public infrastructure investments in land improvements – roads, irrigation, drainage
44	Bolivian timeline http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1218814.stm On China’s relationship with Bolivia and other Latin American nations (Pacific News Service story) http://www.athensnews.com/issue/article.php3?story_id=23487 “The Big Gorilla in the Shadows of Bolivia: The Challenges and Opportunities Confronting Evo Morales.” By Newton Garver. In counterpunch, ed. By alexander cockburn and jeffrey st. clair. Feb. 20, 2006 http://www.counterpunch.org/garver02202006.html
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